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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KATHLEEN MARIA NIEBERGER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040907-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals the trial court's interlocutory order denying her motion to declare 
Utah's child endangerment statute unconstitutional and to quash the bindover. Under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (West 2004), this Court has jurisdiction over all interlocutory 
appeals from second and third degree felonies. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Is Utah's child endangerment statute, which proscribes exposing a child 
to controlled substances or paraphernalia, unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant's 
conduct—i.e., keeping her marijuana and drug paraphernalia where her two young children 
could both see and access it? 
Standard of Review: Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law, 
which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76,142,99 P.3d 820. Whether 
the district court properly interpreted a statute is also a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, \ 8, 84 P.3d 1171. 
Issue No. 2: Is there probable cause to believe that defendant exposed her children 
to controlled substances and drug paraphernalia, where she left marijuana and paraphernalia 
in areas of her home that were accessible to, and in plain view of, her children? 
Standard of Review: Whether to bind a criminal defendant over for trial is a question 
of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, \ 8, 20 P.3d 300. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5. Endangerment of child or elder adult. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intended to be used as a 
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other chemical 
intended to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance. Intent under 
this subsection may be demonstrated by the substance's use, quantity, manner 
of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to manufacturing equipment. 
(b) "Child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection 76-5-
109(l)(a). 
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 58-37a-3. 
(e) "Elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section 76-
5-111. 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers bodily injury, 
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substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of, 
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of the second degree unless the 
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact result in the death of the child or 
elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the 
controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for the child or elder 
adult, and that it was administered to the child or elder adult in accordance 
with the prescription instructions provided with the controlled substance. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has the same definition as 
in Section 58-37-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant, Kathleen Nieberger, was charged with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii), two counts of child endangerment, third degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5, and one count of unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. Rl-2. 
At the preliminary hearing, the State amended the possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute from a third degree felony to a class B misdemeanor. R28-29, 80. After 
the preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound defendant over on all counts. R29, 84. 
Defendant moved to quash the bindover and to declare Utah's child endangerment 
statute (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5) unconstitutional. R35-49. The trial court denied the 
motion after a hearing. Rl 16-26, 140. 
!The record on appeal does not include an official preliminary hearing transcript. 
The pleadings file, however, does include an unofficial preliminary hearing transcript 
prepared by the Legal Defender's Association. For purposes of this interlocutory appeal 
only, the State does not object to using this unofficial transcript. 
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This Court granted defendant's petition for interlocutory review on November 9, 
2004.2 R139. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Defendant, the mother of a three- and a two-year-old, smokes marijuana when she is 
"having a bad week." R56,57a, 66,69,76. She stores her pipe and marijuana in front of the 
VCR on the entertainment center in the living room, where her children can both see the 
items and, if they "had anything to stand on," could reach them. R68. 
On December 22, 2003, officers knocked on the door of defendant's house. R54. 
When no one answered, the officers made a forced entry. Id. The officers were executing 
a search warrant, which authorized them to seize any narcotics, firearms, and any other items 
connected to the possession or distribution of narcotics. Id. The officers entered with guns 
drawn. R71. Detective Jason Watkins, the first officer to enter the house, immediately went 
upstairs to the master bedroom. R54-55. There he found defendant; her husband, Edmund 
Nieberger; and their three-year-old daughter, Cecilia. R55-56. 
2Five days earlier, this Court also granted interlocutory review in State v. Draper, 
Case No. 20040879-CA, which raises the same issues, but under different facts. Both 
cases are on the same briefing schedule. 
3The State recites the evidence at the preliminary hearing "in a light most favorable 
to the prosecution and resolve[s] all inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). 
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Detective Watkins handcuffed both defendant and Edmund. R57. Edmund refused 
to speak with Detective Watkins and was taken into the living room. Id. Defendant waived 
her Miranda rights and agreed to talk to Detective Watkins. R57a. 
Defendant's stash 
Defendant told Detective Watkins that Edmund had been selling marijuana for the 
past five years. R57a. She also admitted that she smokes marijuana once in a while when 
she is "having a bad week/' and that the pipe and baggie of marijuana on the entertainment 
center in the living room belonged to her. R57a-58, 69. 
Officers found defendant's stash "right in front of the VCR" on the entertainment 
center in the living room. R60. A glass marijuana pipe sat next to a "plastic baggie with 
marijuana in it," another pipe, and a plastic bowl containing a small amount of marijuana and 
rolling papers. R60-61,72. The entertainment center was an "open" cabinet, meaning it had 
no doors. Id. The VCR sat on a shelf about five to six feet off the ground. R71. 
Cecilia, the three-year-old, was between two-and-a half to three feet tall. R66-67. 
Her two-year-old sibling was shorter. R66-67. Both children could see the drugs and 
paraphernalia in front of the VCR. R67-68. And, "if [the children] had anything to stand on 
. . . if they get a chair out there . . . [t]hey could have reached the [marijuana and pipe] that 
[were] just right there in plain view on the entertainment center." R68. 
"Just laying around the house9' 
Officers found more contraband throughout the rest of the house. In a cabinet above 
the kitchen counter, officers found a bag containing one hundred and seventy-one grams of 
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marijuana next to a digital scale. R62-64. These items were on the middle or upper shelf, 
about seven feet from the floor. R73. A container with a pipe and baggies were also found 
in a kitchen cabinet above the counter, although Detective Watkins could not remember if 
they were in the same cabinet as the marijuana and scales. R63. A drawer below the kitchen 
counter held a metal tube that was burnt on one end and "looked like it had been used to 
smoke marijuana " R633 77. On the kitchen counter, officers found a Valium pill in a 
baggie. R77. Detective Watkins testified that "one of [the children] would have been able 
to for sure access [the Valium and metal pipe].. . possibly without the assistance but for sure 
if they were standing up on something, the older one." R78. 
When officers searched the master bedroom, they found a broken bong on the floor 
in the closet. R65. Even though Detective Watkins could not remember any marijuana 
residue or water in the bong, he explained, based on his training and experience, that bongs 
are devices used to "inhale marijuana." R65,75. Detective Watkins could not "say for sure 
if [the closet door] was open or closed," when the bong was found. R65. Officers found 
another bong on an entertainment center in the basement. R65. Detective Watkins testified 
that "the fact [that] the items . . . were just laying around the house," was evidence that the 
children had been exposed to drugs and drug paraphernalia. R78. 
In binding defendant over for trial on all charges, the magistrate explained that while 
some of the contraband was out of the children's immediate reach, they could still readily 
access it: 
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Anybody [who] h[as] children or grandchildren [knows] that they ascend to 
unbelievable heights and do so very quickly with the help of each other or the 
help of chairs or anything else. The fact that this house had several rooms 
[with] marijuana, marijuana paraphernalia, none of which was under lock and 
key, none of which was in a safety deposit box, none of which was in any other 
secure or confined area just makes everything in that house, unless it is in the 
attic, available to the kids and that is really not a real difficult matter. 
R83. 
Defendant moved the district court to quash the bindover on the grounds that the child 
endangerment statute is unconstitutionally vague and the State had not shown probable cause 
that defendant had committed child endangerment. See R84,3 5-102. After full briefing and 
a hearing, the district court denied defendant's motion. Rl 16-26. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant argues that the term "exposed to" in the child endangerment 
statute is unconstitutionally vague both facially and as applied to her because it does not give 
fair warning of what is prohibited to persons of ordinary intelligence, and it creates a risk of 
arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Defendant does not have standing to facially 
challenge the child endangerment statute for vagueness, however, because she has not 
alleged or shown that the statute implicates any First Amendment freedom. Defendant, 
therefore, is limited to challenging the statute as vague only as applied to her conduct. 
The term "exposed to" is not vague. Its common ordinary meaning is "to lay open," 
"to leave unprotected," or "to make accessible or subject" to. Read in the context of the 
statute, the term "exposed to" is sufficiently clear to place a person of ordinary intelligence 
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on notice that the statute prohibits defendant's conduct—storing illegal drugs and 
paraphernalia where young children can both see and access them. 
Point II: Defendant alternatively argues that the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence at the preliminary hearing to show that she "exposed" her children to illegal drugs 
and paraphernalia. At the preliminary hearing stage, the prosecution was required to present 
sufficient evidence to support only a reasonable belief that defendant knowingly or 
intentionally caused or permitted her children to be exposed to a controlled substance or drug 
paraphernalia. Here, the prosecutor presented uncontroverted evidence that defendant kept 
her marijuana, pipe, and rolling papers in front of the VCR, above the TV, in the living room, 
on an open entertainment center. The evidence was also uncontroverted that the children 
could see the drugs and paraphernalia and that they could easily access the contraband, which 
was only five to six feet off the ground, by standing on something. Taken together, this 
evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant "exposed" her children to a controlled 
substance and drug paraphernalia. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TERM "EXPOSED TO" IN UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT 
STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED 
TO DEFENDANT BECAUSE HER CONDUCT FELL WELL WITHIN 
THE ORDINARY AND COMMONLY-UNDERSTOOD MEANING OF 
THAT TERM 
Defendant was charged under subsection (2) of Utah's child or elder adult 
endangerment statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (West 2004). That subsection 
makes it a third degree felony for any person to "knowingly or intentionally cause[] or 
permit[] a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with 
a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection 
(1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). 
Defendant argues that the child endangerment statute is "vague on its face and as 
applied to [her]." Br. Aplt. 10. Specifically, defendant contends that the term "exposed to" 
is ambiguous and undefined. Br. Aplt. 10, 18,22. She argues that this ambiguity, coupled 
with the statute's failure "to require danger or a substantial risk of harm," does not give fair 
warning of what is prohibited to persons of ordinary intelligence. Br. Aplt. 18. She also 
asserts that the resulting vagueness creates a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. 
Br. Aplt. 10, 15, 18,21,28-29. 
As explained below, defendant does not have standing to facially challenge the child 
endangerment statute for vagueness because she has not alleged, much less shown, that it 
implicates any First Amendment freedom. She is therefore limited to challenging the statute 
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as vague as applied only to her. Defendant has not shown that the statute is vague as applied 
to her because, read in context, the term "exposed to" is sufficiently clear to place a person 
of ordinary intelligence on notice that the statute prohibits leaving illegal drugs and 
paraphernalia where young children can both see and access them. 
A. Defendant may not complain of the vagueness of a law as applied to the 
hypothetical conduct of others. 
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define the offense 
"' with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited 
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.5" State 
v. Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 43, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983)). A statute need not define an offense with "mathematical certainty," however. 
Graynedv. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104,110 (1972). Statutes may use terms "marked by 
'flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity,'" as long as " it is clear 
what the ordinance as a whole prohibits." Id. (quoting Esteban v. Central Missouri State 
College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969)). 
Vagueness challenges "'which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be 
examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, f 44 (quoting 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n.7 
(1982)). Absent a First Amendment violation, "a court will uphold a facial vagueness 
challenge 'only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.'" State v. 
MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, \ 12, 84 P.3d 1171 (emphasis added). "A statute that is clear as 
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applied to a particular complainant cannot be considered impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications and thus will necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge." Id. Thus, "a 
court should 'examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical 
applications of the law' when a challenged statute 'implicates no constitutionally protected 
conduct.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, f 44 (quoting Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 494-95). 
Here, defendant's conduct—placing her marijuana and pipe in a place where her 
children could both see and access them—does not involve a constitutionally protect right. 
Therefore, "[defendant must show that [the statute] 'is impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications,'" starting with the instant case. State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f^ 12, 97 
P.3d 732 (quoting Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 494-95), cert, granted, 106 P.3d 743. 
To prevail on her vague-as-applied challenge, defendant must show "either (1) that 
the statute[] do[es] not provide 'the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to understand 
what conduct [is prohibited],' or (2) that the statute[] 'encourage[s] arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.'" MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 13 (citations omitted). As explained 
below, defendant has shown neither. 
B. As used in the child endangerment statute, the term "expose to" is sufficiently 
definite to put defendant on notice that her conduct was prohibited. 
As stated, the statute here prohibits a person from intentionally or knowingly causing 
or permitting a child "to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a 
controlled substance . . . or drug paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). 
Defendant contends that because "exposed to" is not defined in the statute, and because the 
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term "encompass [es] a broad spectrum of actions/' the term is ambiguous and did not give 
notice that her conduct was unlawful. Br. Aplt. 22, 25. 
A statute, however, is not ambiguous or unconstitutionally vague merely because it 
does not define a statutory term. See State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 278 (Utah App. 
1995) (observing that although "representation" was subject to multiple meanings, in the 
context of the statute in which it was used, it was not ambiguous); State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 
1182, 1184 (Utah 1981) (upholding statute where "gross deviation" not defined); State v. 
Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, f 14 (upholding statute where "delinquent" not defined); Salt 
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah App. 1997) (statute not unconstitutionally 
vague for failing to define "emotional distress"). Nor is a statute unconstitutionally vague 
merely because it is broad. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960,966 (Utah 1989) ("a statute 
is not unconstitutionally vague because it is broad"). Rather, the "essential test is whether 
the statute imparts fair notice of what conduct is prohibited." Id. A statute places a person 
on notice if it is "sufficiently clear to convey 'warning as to the proscribed conduct when 
measured by common understanding and practices.'" State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ^  14, 
31 P.3d 547 (quoting State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Utah 1983) (other citations and 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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1. In the context of the child endangerment statute, "expose to" means "to 
lay open," "leave unprotected," or "to make accessible or subject to." 
Although not defined in the statute, "expose to" does have "a common understanding 
that is sufficient to put people on warning as to what conduct is prohibited by the statute." 
Morrison, 2001 UT 73, «f 15. The dictionary defines "expose" as 
la: to lay open (as to attack, danger, trial or test): make accessible to 
something that may prove detrimental: deprive of shelter, protection, or care; 
b: to submit or subject to an action or influence <e.g., children to good books>; 
specif: to subject (a sensitive photographic film, plate, or paper) to the action 
of radiant energy; c: to abandon (an infant) esp. by leaving in the open:. . . 2: 
to lay open to view: lay bare: make known: set forth: exhibit, display; b: to 
exhibit for public veneration. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 802 (1993). See also Webster's New World 
Dictionary 501 (4th ed. 2003), as quoted by defendant, Br. Aplt. 22-23.4 
The trial court relied on the dictionary definition to conclude that "exposed" was 
unambiguous. R122. The court then applied "the common sense" and "ordinary and 
accepted meaning of the term 'exposed,'" to the facts of this case. R122. The trial court first 
noted that drugs and paraphernalia "were in plain view and [defendant's children] had free 
access to all of the areas in which paraphernalia and marijuana were found." R122. The 
court then concluded that because "the marijuana, bongs and pipes lay open or were visible 
4The trial court resorted to a different dictionary for its definition of "expose," but 
with the same results: 
La. To remove shelter or protection from; b. To lay open, as to something 
undesirable or injurious. 2. To subject {e.g., a photographic film) to the 
action of light. 3. To make visible . . . 4.a. To make known (e.g., a crime); 
b. To reveal the guilt or wrongdoing of. 5. To abandon or put out without 
shelter or food. 
R122 (quoting Random House Webster's Dictionary 250 (4th ed. 2001). 
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and the children were] not protected from them" the children were therefore "'exposed' to 
the items." R122 (emphasis added). In other words, the children were "exposed" or 
"subjected" to the contraband where they could both see and access the items. 
Defendant essentially agrees that the definition of "expose" adopted by the trial court 
is the one most applicable to the child endangerment statute: 
The statute requires that an adult allow a child 'to be exposed to' a substance 
or paraphernalia; in other words, the language of the statute requires exposure 
of the child to the substance or paraphernalia and not that the substance or 
paraphernalia be exposed to the child. That wording suggests that the first 
definition of "expose" found in Webster's Dictionary, "to lay open (to danger, 
attack, ridicule, etc.); leave unprotected or to make accessible or subject (to an 
influence or action) is the definition applicable to the child endangerment 
statute. 
Br. Aplt. 23 (emphasis added). Thus, like the trial court, defendant reasons that "a child who 
is laid open to or subjected to danger from a controlled substance or paraphernalia, has been 
'exposed to' an item within the meaning of the statute."5 Br. Aplt. 23. 
5On the following page in her brief, defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly 
read the statute because it "concluded that the contraband was visible to the children and 
therefore exposed to them." Br. Aplt. 24. Defendant reasons that "[s]ince the statute 
requires that the children "be exposed to" the contraband, and not the other way around, 
this was an incorrect reading of the statute." Id. But as shown above, the trial court did 
not find that the drugs were exposed to the children; rather, it quite clearly found that the 
children were exposed to the drugs because they could see the contraband and were not 
protected from it—i.e., the children had access to the drugs. R122. In any event, the 
distinction defendant attempts to make is one without a difference. If the drugs are 
"exposed" to children, i.e., accessible and out in the open, then the children are 
necessarily exposed to the drugs. 
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2. The term "expose to" is not rendered vague or ambiguous merely because 
it has multiple meanings. 
Defendant nevertheless asserts that the child endangerment statute is vague because 
while it "makes it unlawful to intentionally allow a child to be exposed to a controlled 
substance or paraphernalia, it does not specify whether being 'exposed to9 requires some 
direct contact or connection, whether being in the vicinity of the contraband without any 
connection is sufficient, or whether simply seeing the contraband amounts to a violation of 
the statute." Br. Aplt. 22. Defendant also contends that because "expose" has "many 
different meanings and applications" it "does not have a commonly understood and accepted 
meaning." Br. Aplt. 23. This, defendant claims, further renders the term ambiguous. Br. 
Aplt 22-23. 
Contrary to defendant's argument, the statute makes clear that "exposed to" does not 
require direct contact. The statute prohibits an adult from permitting a child "to be exposed 
to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance . . . or drug 
paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (emphasis added). This Court assumes that 
the legislature "chose each word carefully" and "would not use two words to mean the same 
thing." State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277,279 (Utah App. 1995). See also Statev. Martinez, 
2002 UT 80, \ 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (in construing statutes, courts "avoid interpretations that will 
render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative"). The fact that the Legislature also 
prohibited adults from allowing children to ingest, inhale, or to have contact with controlled 
substances or paraphernalia proves that "exposed to" necessarily means something other than 
15 
ingesting, inhaling, or having contact with. Id. Thus, "exposed to" does not require that the 
children actually touch, ingest, inhale or otherwise have contact with the contraband. 
Moreover, the fact that "expose" has more than one definition does not render that 
term either ambiguous or vague. This is because statutory terms are not "construed in a 
vacuum." State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f 13,97 P.3d 732. See also Dowlingv. Bullen, 
2004 UT 50,1f 8, 94 P.3d 915 ("[s]ubsections of a statute should not be construed in a 
vacuum but must be read as part of the statute as a whole"). Rather, statutory terms must be 
construed according to their context and "as [they] relatef] to the other terms within the . . 
statute." Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f 13. See also State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992, 994 (Utah 
App. 1993) ("[C]ourts typically construe statutes on the assumption that 'each term is used 
advisedly and that the intent of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context 
and structure in which it is placed.'") (quoting Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 
(Utah 1984) (emphasis in original); State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277,278 (Utah App. 1995) 
(holding that even though term "representation" outside the context of the statute is "subject 
to multiple meanings," the term is not ambiguous "within the context of the statute"). 
As defendant herself acknowledges, when "expose to" is placed in the context of the 
child endangerment statute, it is apparent that the first definition of "expose" applies: "to lay 
open (to danger, attack, ridicule, etc.); leave unprotected or to make accessible or subject (to 
an influence or action)." Br. Aplt. 23. As stated, this is the definition that the trial court 
adopted and applied to this case. R122. And, as explained, that definition, particularly 
within the context of the statute, does not require that the child actually touch, taste, inhale, 
16 
or otherwise have contact with the contraband. Rather, it is enough that the contraband be 
where the child can see and access it. 
3. The Legislature has legitimately determined that "exposing" children to 
illegal drugs and paraphernalia creates a significant risk of harm. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant argues that the child endangerment statute 
is vague because it does not require that the exposure to drugs actually endanger or create a 
substantial risk of harm to the child. Br. Aplt. 10,12,14-21. Defendant claims this omission 
renders the statute vague because it does not give her fair warning that leaving drugs and 
paraphernalia where her children can see and access them is prohibited. Br. Aplt. 10. 
The plain language of the statute, however, unambiguously prohibits exposing 
children to illegal drugs or paraphernalia, irrespective of whether any actual or potential risk 
of harm exists. This is because the Legislature has already determined that a substantial risk 
of harm is inherent in the exposure itself. As explained below, this express legislative choice 
does not render "expose to" either vague or ambiguous. To the contrary, it places all persons 
of ordinary intelligence on notice that exposing children to drugs or paraphernalia, without 
more, violates the statute. 
The Legislature intentionally omitted any requirement that exposure to contraband 
create a substantial risk of harm. The structure of the statute confirms that the Legislature 
intended to prohibit exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact, without more. Subsection 
(2) simply provides that an adult is guilty of a third degree felony if she "knowingly or 
intentionally" causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, 
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or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as 
defined in Subsection (1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). As defendant correctly notes, 
nothing in this subsection requires that any exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact 
actually create a substantial risk of harm or cause harm. Br. Aplt. 18, 20, 24. 27-28. 
But while subsection (2) requires no showing of a risk or actual harm, subsection (3) 
does. Subsection (3) enhances the penalty to a second degree felony if a child "suffers bodily 
injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of, 
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug 
paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(3). That subsection further enhances the 
penalty to a first degree felony if the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in 
death. Id. In the face of subsection (2)'s omission, subsection (3)'s enhancements serve as 
compelling evidence that the Legislature did not intend to require that mere exposure "create 
a substantial risk of harm." 
That intent is supported by the statute's legislative history. Before 2002, the child 
endangerment statute expressly prohibited placing a child "at risk of suffering bodily injury, 
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury from exposure to, ingestion of, inhalation 
o f contraband. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (2000) (emphasis added). See also 2002 
Laws of Utah, ch. 32. In 2002, the Legislature struck the language requiring a showing that 
the child was "at risk of suffering bodily injury." Id. It replaced that language with the 
current subsection (2), which requires only a showing of exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or 
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contact, and with the current subsection (3), which enhances the penalty if actual harm 
results. 
Defendant relies on the floor debates on the 2002 amendment to argue that deleting 
the "at risk" language was "not intended to broaden the reach of the statute and instead was 
aimed at precluding the need for scientific evidence to establish the danger of controlled 
substances." Br. Aplt. 20. Ordinarily, a court should not resort to legislative history when, 
as here, the statute is unambiguous. See Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist, 2002 UT 130, f 
58, 63 P.3d 705 (Durrant, J., concurring and dissenting with two justices concurring); see 
also Okeefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd9 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (the term 
"overtime" is clear and unambiguous and the court has "no need to resort to other methods 
of construction"); Visitor Auth Info. Cntr. v. Customer Service Div., 930P.2d 1196, 1198 
(Utah 1997) ("Unless the statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve 
into the uncertain facts of legislative history"); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. 
v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017,1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, 
it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction"). But in this 
case, contrary to defendant's assertions, the floor debates demonstrate that the Legislature 
did indeed intend to broaden the reach of the child endangerment statute. 
In introducing the 2002 amendment to the House, Representative Beck explained that 
instead of requiring a showing of "risk," the original statute "should have simply made it 
illegal to expose them to a non-prescribed controlled substance." R95. Representative Beck 
elaborated: "Obviously they have already determined that the controlled substances are risky 
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to an individual's health, otherwise they would not be a controlled substance. The same is 
true with the drug paraphernalia and chemicals used to making illegal drugs" Id. 
Representative Beck further explained that the "current language unintentionally requires the 
prosecutor to present scientific evidence to show that the controlled substances are 
dangerous." Id. That, the representative continued, is "not only expensive but it's also 
ridiculous to spend all their time trying to show that." Id. 
Senator Julander expressed similar concerns about the "at risk" language when 
presenting the amendment to the Senate. "Obviously," she explained, "we've already 
determined that controlled substances are risky to an individual's health." Recording of the 
Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, Senate Floor Debates of H.B. 125, Day 40, March 1, 
2002, Tape 46 (transcribed by Adrienne Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney General's 
Office) (attached in Addendum B).6 Thus, she stated, the "current language unintentionally 
requires a prosecutor to present specific evidence to show that controlled substances are 
dangerous." Id. (Emphasis added). Senator Valentine initially objected to the amendment 
because he believed that dropping the "at risk" language would criminalize the innocent 
possession of two or more precursors in a house where children were present. Id. Senator 
Valentine's concern was resolved, however, not by leaving the "at risk" language in, but by 
requiring that possession of any precursors be with the intent to manufacture illegal drugs. 
Recording of the Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, Senate Floor Debates of H.B. 125, Day 
6
 Although defendant has attached transcripts of the House floor debates, she has 
not attached a transcript of the Senate floor debate on the amendment. For the Court's 
convenience, the State has supplied a transcript of that debate at Addendum B. 
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43, March 45 2002, Tape 49 (transcribed by Adrienne Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney 
General's Office) (attached at Addendum B). See also 2002 Law of Utah, ch. 32. 
In sum, the child endangerment statute unambiguously requires a showing that an 
adult permitted a child to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with illegal 
drugs or paraphernalia. Nothing in the plain language requires that the State also prove that 
such exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact creates a significant risk or harm. Indeed, 
as shown by the 2002 amendment and the supporting floor debates, the Legislature 
consciously chose to drop such a requirement. Thus, notwithstanding defendant's claims, 
the Legislature did intend that "expose to" would reach a broader spectrum of conduct than 
it previously had. 
Eliminating the "at risk" language did not render "expose to" unconstitutionally 
vague. As stated, defendant argues that "expose to" is unconstitutionally vague unless the 
statute also requires a substantial risk of harm. To support this claim, defendant relies on two 
out-of-state decisions, State v. Downey, 476 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1985) and Commonwealth v. 
Carter, 462 S.E.2d 582 (Va. Ct. App. 1995). Neither case is helpful, however, because both 
construed statutes completely different from the one at issue here. 
The statute in Downey prohibited a "person having the care, custody or control of a 
dependent" from "knowingly or intentionally [placing] the dependent in a situation that may 
endanger his life or health." Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 122. The Downey court held that the 
statute, construed literally, criminalized exposing a dependent "to the risk of a risk of harm." 
Id. at 123. Thus, "it would be a crime to raise a child in a high-rise apartment or to mop the 
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kitchen floor with a bucket of water in the presence of a small child." Id. This literal 
construction, the Downey court said, had "a broadness and vagueness which would prevent 
it from meeting constitutional muster." Id. To avoid this constitutional infirmity, Downey 
read the statute to require that the "placement must itself expose the dependent in a danger 
which is actual and appreciable." Id. 
Carter interpreted a similar statute. That statute prohibited a child's custodian from 
"willfully or negligently" permitting the child "to be placed in a situation that its life, health 
or morals may be endangered " Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 584 (emphasis added). The Carter 
court concluded that "[b]y using the term 'may,' the legislature criminalize[d] any act which 
presented] a 'possibility' of physical or moral harm to the child." Id. at 585 (citation 
omitted). Accordingly, Carter found this provision of the statute to be unconstitutionally 
vague. Id. 
The statutes in Downey and Carter were not, as defendant suggests, unconstitutionally 
vague because they did not require a significant risk of harm. They were unconstitutionally 
vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would be unable to tell what risk of harm she 
must avoid. 
In contrast, Utah's child endangerment statute specifies the harm it seeks to prevent: 
permitting children to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with illegal drugs 
or paraphernalia. No one is left to guess what risk of harm must be avoided. Rather, the 
statute spells it out: adults must not intentionally or knowingly expose their children to illegal 
drugs or paraphernalia. 
22 
Ultimately, defendant's claim that the statute is vague unless it requires a showing of 
a substantial risk of harm is based on two faulty assumptions. First, defendant assumes that 
because the term "expose" covers a broad spectrum of conduct, it is necessarily vague. But, 
as explained above, a statute is not vague just because it covers a broad spectrum of conduct. 
See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). For example, the Legislature could, 
if it chose, simply penalize possessing illegal drugs and paraphernalia in the same home 
where children are present, whether or not the children were "exposed to" or were even 
aware that drugs were present. The fact that such a statute would catch in its net a broad 
spectrum of behavior would not render the statute unconstitutionally vague because it would 
impart "fair notice" that possession of contraband in a home where children were present 
was strictly prohibited. See id. Indeed, our legislature has already seen fit to enhance drug 
offenses whenever they occur within a 1000 feet of places where children are likely to be 
found—schools, parks, and day care centers. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) (West 2004). 
This enhancement applies whether or not children are actually present at the time of the 
offense, whether they are actually aware of the drugs, or, indeed, whether the drugs, in fact, 
present a substantial risk of harm. 
Defendant's second faulty assumption is that exposure to illegal drugs or 
paraphernalia does not create a risk of harm so long as the child does not actually touch, 
ingest, inhale, or otherwise have contact with the drug. But, as stated, however, the 
Legislature has already determined—as evidenced by the statute's plain language and 
legislative history—that exposure alone does create a serious risk of harm for children. This 
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legislative determination is not without support. According to a recent study by the National 
Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, "[cjhildren of illicit drug 
abusers are likelier than children of non-drug abusers to demonstrate immature, impulsive 
or irresponsible behavior, to have lower IQ scores, more absences from school and to have 
behavioral problems, depression and anxiety—all signs of risk for substance abuse." CASA 
White Paper, Family Matters: Substance Abuse and The American Family, The National 
Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University 12 (March 2005), 
available at http://www.casacolumbia.org. "Children of drug abusing parents, particularly 
drug-abusing mothers, are [also] more likely to be disobedient, aggressive, withdrawn and 
detached. These children also tend to have fewer friends, lower confidence in their ability 
to make friends and a greater likelihood of being avoided by their peers." Id. According to 
this study, these children are also at a heightened risk of being abused or neglected. Id. at 
20. 
In short, exposing a child to illegal drugs and paraphernalia creates an inherent risk 
of harm. The term "expose to," therefore, is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the 
statute does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm. Rather, the question is 
whether the statute would place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that defendant's 
conduct is prohibited.7 
defendant's brief posits several hypotheticals in support of her claim that 
"expose" can be read so broadly as to allow prosecution for a host of innocent behavior, 
such allowing a child to see "Drano stored in the same cupboard as a glass container or 
iodine"; discussing controlled substances or paraphernalia in front of a child; or taking a 
child "into a store where cigarette rolling papers are sold." Br. Aplt. 25. First, as 
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4. Defendant's conduct falls well within the common ordinary meaning of 
"exposed to." 
As both the magistrate and the district court recognized, defendant's conduct falls 
"unmistakably within the statute's purview." Green, 2004 UT 7 6 4 52. R83,122. Indeed, 
defendant's conduct is precisely what the child endangerment statute seeks to prevent. As 
stated, "expose" means "to lay open," "leave unprotected," "to make accessible," or to 
"subject" one to something, such as an influence or action. Br. Aplt. 23 (quoting Webster's 
New World Dictionary 501 (4th ed. 2003). Under that definition, defendant's children were 
"exposed to" illegal drugs and paraphernalia. 
Drugs and paraphernalia were scattered throughout defendant's home. R58-66. 
Although defendant claimed only a small portion of the contraband as her own, she admitted 
to police that she knew her husband had been dealing drugs for the past five years. R57A-58. 
Thus, she was well aware that he kept drugs and paraphernalia in the house. Indeed, she 
admitted to using the marijuana when "she was having a bad week." R57A. 
explained above, defendant may not complain of the vagueness of a statute as applied to 
the hypothetical conduct of others. See Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 44. Second, none of 
defendant's examples would be covered under the statute. The child endangerment 
statute requires that a person "knowingly or intentionally cause[] or permit[] a child . . to 
be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical 
substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1)." Subsection (1) 
specifically requires that possession of any chemical substances be "intended to be used 
as a precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
112.5(l)(a). Likewise, the definition of "drug paraphernalia" only encompasses those 
items that are "intended for" use in manufacturing or introducing a controlled substance 
in to the body. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(d) & § 58-37a-3. The statute's clear 
scienter requirements "mitigates any existing vagueness." Green, 2004 UT 76, f 49. 
Moreover, nothing in the definition of "expose" suggests, even remotely, that discussing 
drugs in front of a child is prohibited. 
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And even though some of the contraband—high up in the kitchen cabinet—was out 
of sight and out of reach, much of it was in plain view and readily accessible by the children: 
the broken bong on the closet floor of the master bedroom (where Cecilia was when police 
arrive); a Valium in a baggie on the kitchen counter; a burnt tube in a kitchen drawer; and 
marijuana, pipes, and rolling papers in front of the VCR in the living room. 
Significantly, defendant claimed ownership in the marijuana and paraphernalia stored 
where the children could both see and access them. R58, 67-68. Defendant suggests that 
because the contraband was out of the children's reach, they were not "exposed" to it. Br. 
Aplt. 20, 26. But five to six feet off the ground is not all that high for a three-year-old to 
reach. As the detective testified, a child that old could easily move a chair or other object 
and climb up to where the contraband was stored. R68. 
As the district court concluded, "the marijuana, bongs and pipes lay open or were 
visible and the child[ren were] not protected from them." R122. Given these facts and the 
plain, ordinary meaning of "expose," a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that 
defendant's conduct was prohibited. 
C. "Expose to'5 is not so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. 
Defendant argues that "expose to" is so vague that it encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. Br. Aplt. 28. Again, in an as-applied challenge, this Court 
"must focus on the particular conduct at hand and not on the possible conduct of hypothetical 
parties." Green, 2004 UT 76, Tf 51. Thus, the question is whether "law enforcement officials 
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encountering [defendant's] circumstances would . . . be left to pursue their own personal 
predilections in determining the applicability of Utah's [child endangerment] statute." Id. at 
If 52. They would not. 
Here, law enforcement officers found drugs and paraphernalia scattered throughout 
a home where two young children lived. Some of the drugs and paraphernalia were in plain 
view of the children and in places where they could access them. This conduct fall squarely 
within the plain meaning of the term "expose to" and therefore would not leave a law 
enforcement officer to decide, in his discretion, "that the statute's provisions should not 
apply." Id. Indeed, leaving drugs and paraphernalia out in plain view where children can 
access them is precisely the kind of conduct that the child endangerment seeks to prevent. 
Defendant's vagueness challenge accordingly fails. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AT PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT 
DEFENDANT COMMITTED CHILD ENDANGERMENT WHERE 
SHE INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY LEFT MARIJUANA AND 
PARAPHERNALIA IN AREAS OF HER HOME THAT WERE 
ACCESSIBLE TO, AND IN PLAIN VIEW OF, HER CHILDREN 
Defendant argues that even if "exposed to" is construed broadly, the State "failed to 
establish probable cause to believe that [she] had committed two counts of child 
endangerment." Br. Aplt. 38. Defendant's argument is based primarily on the theory that 
because her children could not reach the contraband without standing on anything, they were 
not "exposed to" the contraband. Br. Aplt. 43-49. 
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Bindover standard. "To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 
'probable cause5 at a preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.5" State v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 10, 20 P.3d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 
1995) (additional internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also State v. Talbot, 
972 P.2d 435,437 (Utah 1998). Thus, "to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
must. . . produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged."5 Clark, 2001 
UT 9, % 15 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a 
bindover is the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at ^ 16. Under both 
standards, the prosecution must only present "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it.55 Id. 
(Emphasis added). 
In determining whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant 
committed each element of the charged offense, "[t]he magistrate must view all the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the prosecution.55 Id. at f 10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(alteration in original). See also State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f^ 3, 26 P.3d 223 
(magistrate must "resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution55). "[W]hen faced with 
conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave 
those tasks to the fact finder at trial.55 Clark, 2001 UT 9, f^ 10 (internal quotation marks and 
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citations omitted). Thus, when the evidence gives rise to alternative reasonable inferences, 
the magistrate must choose those inferences that support the State's case. See id at f 20 
(although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to two alternate inferences - one suggesting 
innocence and the other guilt - viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 
evidence supported probable cause); see also Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f 20 ("Although 
defendants' characterizations of the facts may also be plausibly inferred from the evidence, 
there are clearly factual issues that must be resolved at trial, and the facts do not negate the 
reasonable inferences presented by the State"). 
This case. The prosecution here was required to present sufficient credible evidence 
to support a reasonable belief that defendant "knowingly or intentionally cause[d] or 
permitted]" her children "to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a 
controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection 
(1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). Defendant correctly points out that there was no 
evidence that her children ingested, inhaled, or had contact with any of the controlled 
substances or paraphernalia found throughout her home. Br. Aplt. 43. The question, then, 
is whether the evidence was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable belief that defendant 
knowingly or intentionally exposed her children to illegal drugs or paraphernalia. As 
explained in Point I above, the answer is, "yes." 
Detective Watkins testified that officers found numerous items of drugs and drug 
paraphernalia throughout defendant's home. R53-54,60-65. In the living room, on the south 
wall, there was an entertainment center. R60. The entertainment center was open; it had no 
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doors. Id. In front of the VCR, on the shelf above the TV, officers found a glass pipe that 
"marijuana [is] commonly smoked in," a small plastic baggie of marijuana, a plastic bowl 
with marijuana rolling papers and some marijuana inside, another marijuana pipe, and a tool 
used to scrape resin out of a pipe. R60-61. Defendant told Detective Watkins that "the only 
marijuana or things in the house that belonged to her were out on the entertainment 
center/TV stand." R58. 
Detective Watkins testified that the living room wras accessible to the children; there 
were no child gates or doors blocking entry into the room. R67. Defendant's "stash" sat 
only five or six feet above the ground and it was stored in a place—in front of the VCR—that 
her children might want tempted to reach. R60, 71. Based on his observations of the 
children's age and height and the location of the contraband, Detective Watkins testified that 
Cecilia could easily have reached her mother's marijuana and paraphernalia merely by 
standing on something such as a chair.8 R68. 
The State notes that the magistrate had the benefit of photographs showing the 
actual placement of items and how visible and accessible they would be to the children. 
Those photos are not in the appellate record, however, because the prosecutor withdrew 
them after the preliminary hearing and the defendant did not take the steps necessary to 
include them in the record on appeal. The magistrate's advantaged viewpoint on this 
issue should therefore be given some deference. See State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, <[ 13, 
69 P.3d 1278 ("When crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions 
are presumed to support the action of the trial court"). 
30 
Taken together the above evidence gives rise to a reasonable belief that defendant 
knowingly or intentionally "exposed" her children to illegal drugs and paraphernalia by her 
contraband in plain view and where her children could access it with little difficulty.9 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks the Court to affirm the district 
court's denial of defendant's motion to quash the bindover. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this o&^dav of Cfi*** 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
OJRAB.DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
9Defendant nevertheless asserts that there was "no evidence that the children had 
any access to these items, that the items qualified as contraband under the child 
endangerment statute or that the children were 'exposed' to them." Br. Aplt. 46-47. As 
stated, the children clearly had access to defendant's contraband in front of the VCR, as 
well as to the bong on the closet floor in the master bedroom. The children were thus 
"exposed" to that contraband. This Court should not address defendant's claim that no 
evidence showed that the items qualified as contraband because she never challenged the 
bindover on that basis. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 27. In 
any event, defendant is mistaken. The evidence amply demonstrated that the items found 
qualified as contraband under the child endangerment statute. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT m 
HLED_ 
OCT!3 PH&56 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
 T m m 
West Valley Department ] ™$fVALLEY OEPT. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
KATHLEEN MARIA NIEBERGER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Motion to Quash / Declare Utah 
Code § 76-5-112 5 Unconstitutional) 
Case No. 041100233 
Judge Terry L. Christiansen 
The above matter came before the Court for oral argument on Kathleen Maria 
Nieberger's (Defendant) motion to quash bindover / declare Utah Code § 76-5-112 5 
unconstitutional on September 13, 2004. Lana Taylor appeared onbehalf of the State of Utah 
and Shannon Romero appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Court took the matter under 
advisement. Having reviewed the file and having researched the law pertaining to the issue, the 
Court DENIES the Defendant's motion to quash / declare Utah Code § 76-5-112 5 
unconstitutional. 
BACKGROUND 
1 On December 22, 2003, Salt Lake County Detective Jason Watkins (Watkins) executed a 
search warrant at Defendant's residence, located at 5944 West Honesilver Circle, Salt 
Lake County. 
2 Watkins found Defendant and her husband and their three year old child in the master 
bedroom. 
3 While the residence was searched, Watkins interviewed the Defendant. During the 
interview, the Defendant admitted that she used marijuana "when having a bad week." 
4 The Defendant also admitted that several items in the residence were hers, e.g., items in 
the entertainment center, which included a marijuana pipe, a small plastic baggie of 
marijuana, a container of marijuana and another marijuana pipe in with it, and a tool 
suspected of being used for scraping resin from marijuana pipes. 
5 Additional items were found in the kitchen, e.g., a large bag of marijuana, a bag 
containing a marijuana pipe, and a small metal item in a kitchen drawer that may have 
been used for smoking or burning marijuana, also a bong was found in the basement 
entertainment center and another bong was found in the master bedroom closet. 
6 The drugs and paraphernalia were in plain view and a child had free access to all of the 
areas in which paraphernalia and marijuana were found. 
7 Defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 
Utah Code § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii), a third degree felony, two counts of endangerment of a 
child or elder adult in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-112.5, a third degree felony; and 
possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Utah Code § 58-37A-5. 
8 At the preliminary hearing, on June 10, 2004, the State amended the first count to be 
possession of marijuana, in violation of § 58-37-8, a class B misdemeanor. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court bound over for trial concluding that there was 
sufficient evidence to find probable cause on count I as amended, and counts II, III and 
IV as charged. 
9 Thereafter, the Defendant filed the present motion to quash / declare Utah Code § 76-5-
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112.5 unconstitutional challenging both (1) the constitutionality of the endangerment of 
child or elder adult statute, § 76-5-112.5 and (2) the quantum of proof produced by the 
State at the preliminary hearing that the Defendant committed the crime of endangerment 
of a child. 
I 
VAGUENESS 
In deciding the constitutionality of a statute, the court must first analyze the plain 
language of the statute. State v. Macguire, 2004 UT 4, ^ [15, 84 P.3d 1171, 1175. "We need not 
look beyond the plain language unless we find some ambiguity in it." Id at [^15 {citing Utah Sch 
Bds.Ass'nv. State Bd OfEduc, 2001 UT2, [^13, 17P.3d 1125). 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) provides: 
Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly 
or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest 
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
"A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law. . . . When addressing 
such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable 
doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, p, 31 P.3d 547. 
"Additionally, legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, and those who challenge 
a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ft42 (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
"[Vjagueness questions axe essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the 
statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct." Id at [^43. Where a statute "implicates no 
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constitutionally protected conduct, a court will uphold a facial vagueness challenge only if the 
[statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." State v. Macguire, supra, 2004 UT at 
Tfl2 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estate v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
494-95 (1982). 
A statute that is clear as applied to a particular complainant cannot be considered 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications and thus will necessarily survive a 
facial vagueness challenge.... In order to establish that the complained of 
provisions are impermissibly vague, a defendant must demonstrate either (1) that 
the statutes do not provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to 
understand what conduct [is prohibited], or (2) that the statutes encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Id at 1fl3 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Green, supra, 
2004 UT at ^43 . 
"If a statute is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is 
prohibited, it is not unconstitutionally vague." Id at \\A. "[A] defendant who engages in some 
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the 
conduct of others." State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App. 326, |^44 (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
"[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms 
must be examined in light of the facts at hand. . . . Additionally, a court should examine the 
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law when a 
challenged statute implicates no constitutionally protected conduct." State v. Green, supra, 2004 
UT at [^44 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). 
Utah courts have upheld statutes with undefined terms that were challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah \9U)(upheld 
statute where "gross deviation" was undefined); State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App. 54, }^14, 975 
P.2d 489, 496 (Utah App. \999)(upheld statute where "delinquent" was undefined); Salt Lake 
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City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah App. \991)(upheld statute where "emotional distress" 
was undefined). 
In State v. Owens, supra, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the statute legitimately 
proscribed a broad spectrum of conduct and the undefined term had a common sense meaning. 
638P.2datll84. 
In State v. Krueger, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah relied upon the widespread 
usage of the terms "delinquency" and "contributing to the delinquency" of a minor to give clear 
and understandable meaning to those terms of the statute. State v. Krueger, supra, 1999 UT 
App. at TJ14. The Court of Appeals evaluated the connotation of those terms and whether such 
connotations were "sufficiently well known that persons of ordinary intelligence and judgment 
who desire to do so would have no difficulty in governing their conduct by the statute." Id at 
1115. 
In Salt Lake City v. Lopez, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah relied upon the statute's 
specific intent requirement and stated that "a specific intent requirement significantly vitiates any 
claim that its purported vagueness could mislead a person of common intelligence into 
misunderstanding what is prohibited." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, supra, 935 P.2d at 1265. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals examined the complainant's conduct before analyzing other 
hypothetical applications of the law to determine whether the statute was unconstitutionally 
applied to the defendant. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that given the defendant's 
knowledge and conduct, he could not claim that the statute was vague as applied to him, "let 
alone that the statute is totally invalid and incapable of any valid application." Id 
When a term is undefined, the term's ordinary and accepted meaning is often taken from 
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the dictionary. See, e.g., Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 UT App. 344, fil3, 994 P.2d 206 (defining 
"peril" with Webster's Dictionary). 
A 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) is presumed to be constitutional, therefore, Defendant bears a 
heavy burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality. The Court concludes that Defendant fails 
to carry her heavy burden. Section 76-5-112.5(2) clearly gives notice that ordinary people of 
intelligence and judgment who desire to do so would have no difficulty in governing their 
conduct by the statute. Ordinary people of intelligence and judgment reading § 76-5-112.5(2) 
would understand that if a person knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder 
adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia they are guilty of a third degree felony. 
There is no constitutional right to causing or permitting a child to be exposed to or have 
contact with a controlled substance, a chemical substance or drug paraphernalia, therefore, 
Defendant's facial vagueness challenge will succeed only if the statute is "impermissibly vague 
in all of its applications." State v. Macguire, supra, 2004 UT at [^12. 
The Defendant contends that the term "exposed" is undefined and therefore, does not 
provide a person of reasonable intelligence with enough detail to know what type of conduct is 
prohibited. The Defendant argues that there is no way of knowing what is meant by the term 
"exposed." The Court does not agree. 
The term "exposed" needs no definition to be constitutional. By not defining the term 
"exposed" the legislature did not "impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to judges and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis" as argued by the Defendant. Rather, the 
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legislature allows the fact finder to evaluate the facts of a case and apply the term "exposed" 
using the common sense or ordinary meaning of the term. "Expose" as defined by Webster's is: 
La. To remove shelter or protection from; b. To lay open, as to something 
undesirable or injurious. 2. To subject (e.g., a photographic film) to the action of 
light. 3. To make visible . . . 4 a. To make known (e.g., a crime); b. To reveal the 
guilt or wrongdoing of. 5. To abandon or put out without shelter or food. 
Random House Webster's dictionary at 250 (4th Ed. 2001); see also Webster's II: New Riverside 
University Dictionary at 452 (1988). 
The statute legitimately reaches a broad spectrum of conduct to allow the fact finder to 
determine under the specific facts of the case whether the child or elder were "exposed" to "a 
controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia." There is no ambiguity in the 
statute and since the plain meaning of the statute is clear using the ordinary and accepted 
meaning of the term "exposed," the Court need not look to the legislative intent. 
Under the facts of this case, the Defendant admitted that she owned a marijuana pipe, a 
small plastic baggie of marijuana, a container of marijuana and another marijuana pipe in with it, 
and a tool suspected of being used for scraping resin from marijuana pipes. Furthermore, 
additional items were found in the kitchen, e.g., a large bag of marijuana, a bag containing a 
marijuana pipe, and a small metal item in a kitchen drawer that may have been used for smoking 
or burning marijuana, also a bong was found in the basement entertainment center and another 
bong was found in the master bedroom closet. These items were in plain view and Defendant's 
child had free access to all of the areas in which paraphernalia and marijuana were found. 
Applying the common sense, ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "exposed," the 
marijuana, bongs and pipes lay open or were visible and the child was not protected from them, 
therefore, the child was "exposed" to the items. Moreover, the intent requirement that the 
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Defendant "knowingly or intentionally" exposed the child significantly vitiates the impact of not 
defining the term "exposed" because a person of common intelligence would understand what is 
prohibited. 
As applied in this case, Section 76-5-112.5(2) is constitutional, therefore, the statute 
cannot be "impermissibly vague in all of its applications" as required to succeed on a vagueness 
challenge. 
Defendant also argues that § 76-5-112.5(2) encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement because there are not minimal guidelines or circumstances where "exposure" occurs 
to guide law enforcement and judges, therefore, they consciously or subconsciously discriminate 
against certain classes of individuals. 
Although the Court need not address this challenge, because the Court previously decided 
that as applied in this case § 76-5-112.5(2) is constitutional, the Court clarifies that § 76-5-
112.5(2) legitimately proscribes a broad spectrum of conduct. To attempt to define guidelines or 
circumstances would be arbitrary. See, e.g., State v. Owens, supra, 638 P.2d at 1184-85. As 
written, § 76-5-112.5(2) avoids arbitrarily narrowing the proscribed conduct and allows the fact 
finder to determine whether under the circumstances the child or elder person was "exposed" to 
"a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia" applying the common sense, 
ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "exposed." 
B 
Defendant also argues that § 76-5-112.5(2) is unconstitutionally vague because the statute 
appears to criminalize potential harm rather than actual harm. Specifically, Defendant argues 
that the mere possibility or risk of "exposure" is sufficient to support the charge, which is 
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unconstitutional and cites several non-binding cases. The Court is not persuaded. 
Based upon the common sense or ordinary meaning of the term "exposed" as stated 
above, a person may decide under the circumstances whether the child or elder adult was 
"exposed" to the prohibited items. The Court is not inclined to believe that the only harm is 
actual inhalation, ingesting or contact with because the Legislature did include the term 
"exposed," which under the general ordinary meaning of the word includes "to lay open," or 
"make visible," or "to remove shelter or protection from." These definitions are less than actual 
inhalation, ingestion or contact with, but are within the ordinary meaning of "exposed." 
Furthermore, just because a child or elder adult does not inhale, ingest or have contact with the 
prohibited items does not mean that they are not harmed. 
n 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
Alternatively, the Defendant argues that the State failed to demonstrate probable cause to 
believe the Defendant committed the offense of child endangerment. The Court does not agree. 
The "quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover" is the same as that required 
for issuance of an arrest warrant: "[T]he prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State 
v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 16. The Court outlined the magistrate's role, summarizing the 
conclusions of a number of prior cases: 
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show probable cause at a 
preliminary hearing by presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. At this 
stage of the proceeding, the evidence required [to show probable cause] . . . is 
relatively low because the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the 
investigation continues. Accordingly, when faced with conflicting evidence, the 
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magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the 
fact finder at trial. Instead, the magistrate must view all evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the prosecution. Yet, the magistrate's role in this process, while limited, is not 
that of a rubber stamp for the prosecution . . . . Even with this limited role, the 
magistrate must attempt to ensure that all groundless and improvident 
prosecutions are ferreted out no later than the preliminary. 
Id, at If 10 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; interpolation by the Court; 
emphasis added). The Clark court held "that to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
must still produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Id. (Internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Schroyer, 44 P.3d 730, 732 (Utah 2002); State v. 
Robinson, 63 P.3d 105, 106 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) provides: 
Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly 
or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest 
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in the State's favor, the Court concludes that the State met its burden to bindover to 
show a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. 
As stated above, supra I.A., the Defendant admitted that she owned a marijuana pipe, a small 
plastic baggie of marijuana, a container of marijuana and another marijuana pipe in with it, and a 
tool suspected of being used for scraping resin from marijuana pipes. Furthermore, additional 
items were found in the kitchen, e.g., a large bag of marijuana, a bag containing a marijuana pipe, 
and a small metal item in a kitchen drawer that may have been used for smoking or burning 
marijuana, also a bong was found in the basement entertainment center and another bong was 
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found in the master bedroom closet. The Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence at 
the preliminary hearing to show probable cause that Defendant knowingly or intentionally caused 
her child to be exposed to a controlled substance, chemical substance or drug paraphernalia. 
The Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash bindover / declare Utah Code § 76-5-
112 5 unconstitutional. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Senate Floor Debates on 2002 Amendment 
to Child Endangerment Statute 
Senate Debate on HB 125 March 1, 2002 
54th Leg. General Session, Day 40 Tape 46 
Mr. President: Let's next go to house bill 125 
: House bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with controlled substance or 
precursor, by representative (inaudible) Senator Joe Lander. 
Mr. President: Senator Julander. 
Senator Julander: There were two over sights dealing in the section dealing with a child 
or elder adult in 76-5-112.5. We will correct those two problems with this bill. The first 
problem is that the section contains an awkward (inaudible) requirement. Obviously 
we've already determined that controlled substances are risky to an individual's health. 
The current language unintentionally requires a prosecutor to present specific evidence to 
show that controlled substances are dangerous. This is not only expensive it's rather 
ridiculous. The other oversight in this section is that it contains no exceptions for drugs, 
which are administered in accordance with a prescription from a physician; this bill also 
fixes that problem. This bill was requested by the State Wide Association of Prosecutors 
and supported by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice and (inaudible) 
Commission, the Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, and the Utah Substance 
Abuse Anti-Violence Counsel. It passed unanimously in all committees and on the house 
floor. 
Mr. President: Senator Valentine? 
Senator Valentine: Thank you Mr. President. This bill (inaudible). 
Senator Julander: I can't hear him. 
Mr. President: Try him again; let's see if it'll turn on (inaudible) again. Oh that's better. 
Senator Valentine: I don't think, that it was an oversight. Specifically lines 27, 28, and 
29,1 remember the debate on this, and I remember that this was one of the elements of a 
different crime. So that we have a different crime, of being exposed in addition to the 
possession or the obvious crime of having the drug paraphernalia, the drugs themselves, 
um, of having um, a meth. Lab, but the additional crime in addition to the, the underlying 
crime was this exposure, and so by deleting out 27, 28, and 29 you now make it an 
automatic crime. So that if the drug paraphernalia is in the same house someplace as the 
child, but all of the sudden now you have two crimes that have been committed. And we 
talked about that very thing, and we argued back and forth about that and we finally 
decided that we wanted to have that felony crime, that enhanced crime there when you 
had to prove one additional element, and the element was, the very things you're 
dropping out. Can you tell me now why we will have two crimes for one action, by 
dropping that out? Why that's good policy? 
1 
Senator Julander: (There's still two crimes) I, if I understand your question, there's still 
two crimes, but you don't. But, but if you look at line 17, it already defines the chemical 
substance. 
Senator Valentine: Yea, that's the chemical substance, but if it's someplace in the 
dwelling, maybe even totally removed from where the children can get to, you're saying 
now it's a second crime because you've dropped out, you make it an automatic second 
crime. You dropped out the exposure provision, which was the provision that we 
negotiated to put in as the second element of the crime. 
Senator Julander: But if you, uh if they have to be exposed to it if you look in 33-32 they 
have to exposed to it or ingest it. 
Senator Valentine: But aren't you dropping out in the previous lines the exposure? Cause 
you're saying unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally cause or permits a child or elder adult to be, and then you 
have the language you're dropping out, which is the 'at risk' language. Isn't that 
dropping out the exposure? 
Senator Julander: But look on 29 it's exposed to, to ingest or inhale. 
Senator Valentine: Obviously if you're dealing drugs to a kid, then that one is covered by 
three. 
Senator Julander: Excuse me? 
Senator Valentine: If you're dealing drugs to a child then that one is covered by 
paragraph three, and that's very obvious. I mean, and that should be an enhanced penalty. 
It's just the exposure of it being in the premises that I'm worried about. (Murmurs) See 
one of the problems is that if you have it just to the list of precursors on line 17 as you 
originally talked about, there are some things on those list of precursors that are in a lot of 
houses, probably your house. I could probably find some of those items; uh for example, 
uh some of those items in smaller quantities are in your medicine cabinet. But you need 
to be able to show exposure to those items, so that you cannot have a crime. I mean, that 
bothers me that you'd have a crime just because it's in the house. Let me give you one 
example, ephedrine, that in over the counter medications for decongestant, that's 
probably in medicine cabinet some place. Does that mean you committed a crime 
because you're grandchildren are in the same house as you are? That's wh, that's what's 
worrying me. 
Mr. President: Senator Julander? 
Senator Julander: I really think this is a policy question, and I would like to get more 
information, and get to you and circle the bill at the proper time. 
2 
Mr. President: Thank you I was going to suggest that you circle it for now, and then we'll 
get back to it. 
Senator Lander: I will get back with you; I would like to circle the bill. 
Senator Valentine: And senator thank you very much, I'm sorry these things are coming 
up pretty fast and I didn't get to talk to you in advance. 
Senator Lander: That's okay. That's okay; we'll clear it up. 
Senator Valentine: Thank you. 
Mr. President: The motion is to circle the bill, all in favor say aye. 
Senate: Aye 
Mr. President: Opposed? Motion passes. Senator Steel. 
Senator Steel: Thank you Mr. President. 
3 
Senate Debate on HB 125 March 4, 2002 
54th Leg. General Session, Day 43 Tape 49 
Mr. President: Senator Julander. I'm sorry I didn't give you a mic. 
Senator Julander: We discussed this bill on Friday, and Senator Valentine raised some 
questions and had some amendments, at this time I would yield to Senator Valentine. 
Mr. President: Yes, Senator Valentine I'm sorry, I'm day dreaming up here. 
Senator Valentine: There's someplace here that I had some amendments on this messy 
desk. They were passed out earlier, I. I'm not quite sure where they are, have we got 
those? Mr. President I move the amendments, and amendment number one under my 
name did it March 1st, 2002. Let me explain those amendments, I raised some issues last 
time about incidental contact with precursors with the, the elements and substances that 
are in precursors. And uh, after going back and talking with some of our prosecutors we 
found we did have a problem indeed, the problem is that, uh there has to be a sufficient 
amount intended to be used in the manufacturing of a controlled substance, and then the 
intent would then be presumed by the elements that were in the present bill. But that's 
what the amendment does, it uh, makes it so that the problems that I raised last time 
would not therefore be in the bill. That's my motion to amend. 
Mr. President: Questions on the motion to amend? All in favor of the amendment say 
aye. 
Senate: Aye 
Mr. President: Opposed? Motion passes; the bill as before us is amended. Senator Jewel 
Julander? 
Senatpr Julander: Thank you, uh I don't remember having any other questions, but at this 
time I would take any other question if there are any regarding this piece of legislation. 
Mr. President: Any questions on this legislation? See none Senator. 
Senator Julander: I call for the vote that we, uh, under the suspension of the rules 
(inaudible). That we move to the third calendar. 
Mr. President: Motion is shall House Bill 123 be read for the third time, roll call vote. 
Roll call vote is done, (inaudible). 
Mr. President: Senator Bramble? 
4 
Senator Bramble: I apologize I've been having trouble getting my computer up, but I vote 
I on this. This is a bill that I spoke with the attorney that drafted it, and we resolved the 
issues I'd misunderstood that bill. So I do vote aye on it. 
: Hickman 
Mr. President: No there's nobody up there Senator Hickman. 
: Senator Hickman? 
Mr. President: That wasn't a voice from heaven, that's the roll call. 
Senator Hickman: Aye. 
Roll call finishes. 
Mr. President: I'm waiting for a voice from heaven like Senator Hickman, to give me an 
indication. Alright, House Bill 125, received 25 aye votes, no nay votes, four being 
absent passes to the third (inaudible) calendar. We'll now go to House Bill 206. 
5 
